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Abstract 
 
The integration of science into policing functions continues to be a subject of 
considerable official concern. Sociological study of forensic science has demonstrated 
great promise in illuminating the dynamics of the law-science relationship, but has yet 
to be fully extended to issues relating to policing. This paper seeks to address the 
importance of extending research activity in this area by addressing the effects of 
broader political and economic trends on the development of forensic science and its 
use in criminal investigations. It focuses on the influence of ‘liberalizing’ policies on 
policing functions, which have extended to the provision of scientific support to the 
police. Forensic scientific services in England and Wales are now procured via a 
market-led system, and an economic imperative can be seen to have permeated strongly 
into this domain. With recourse to examples of a series of initiatives, I show how the 
application of liberalizing processes has permeated into the science-police relationship 
in various ways, leading to the emergence of assemblages which serve to differentially 
reconstruct the relationship between forensic scientists and their chief ‘customers’, the 
police. I argue that these differences in reconstruction reflect ongoing tensions between 
two different interpretations of scientific integration – one which is science-led and 
another which is police-led. Drawing upon these examples, I demonstrate how these 
tensions manifest themselves, but also show how these two interpretations co-exist. I 
show how an exploration of these initiatives aids understanding of how science, 
policing, and liberal modes of governance co-evolve.   
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Introduction 
 
The incorporation of science into the criminal justice system continues to be a key 
preoccupation of official discourses. Such concerns have ranged from the effectiveness 
by which police use the products of forensic science (ACPO/FSS/Audit Commission 
1996, HMIC 2002), the timeliness of the provision of scientific services to the police 
(NAO 1998), how to measure the contribution forensic science makes to police 
performance (McCulloch and Tilley 2000; Burrow et al 2005), to more strategic 
concerns about the most effective means to organize the reconciliation of science and 
technology with policing (Home Office, 2003, 2009), as well as the issue of ultimately 
determining the admissibility of expert evidence (Law Commission 2009). Such 
concerns are also prevalent within and between other jurisdictions (NAS 2009, Wilson 
2009). Even this list, which is far from exhaustive, demonstrates the magnitude of the 
problem space, and the significance accorded to the relationship between science and 
criminal justice. Attempts to address these issues are problematized further, however, 
by the high degree of heterogeneity apparent within the landscape of forensic science. 
This landscape consists of a plethora of knowledges, practices, artefacts and 
interactions, which, together with the varying contribution forensic science makes to 
policing, resists simple academic comprehension (Fraser and Williams 2009).  
 
A growing number of Science and Technology Studies (STS) researchers have drawn 
attention to the complexities of shaping scientific knowledge in the service of the law, 
particularly in the context of the courtroom (Jasanoff 1998, Cole 1998, Lynch and 
McNally 2003, Lynch 2004). As insightful as such studies undoubtedly are, there 
remains a pressing need for STS scholarship to continue to address the integration of 
science at other stages of the criminal justice system. Research has tended to focus on 
more localized instances of the construction of ‘forensic’ knowledge, and there have 
been very few attempts to reconcile the insights of these studies with the broader 
institutional contexts which frame the activities of law enforcement actors. A failure to 
do so means that STS scholarship in this area is limited to providing only a brief series 
of snapshots of a complex area. Such approaches, while enabling a fine-grained 
assessment of the social dynamics of the construction of forensic scientific knowledge, 
are highly constrained in terms of their spatial and temporal reach. While some studies 
have sought to assess the development of specific forensic technologies from broader 
historical perspectives (Cole 2001, Aronson 2007, Gerlach 2004), there exists a marked 
absence of understanding regarding the organizational influences which condition 
police expectations and uses of the products of forensic scientific activity in general 
(Williams 2007a: 766).  
 
One important related issue concerns the apparent influence of the so-called ‘New 
Public Management’ (NPM). Numerous official reports, which have assessed the 
‘effectiveness and timeliness’ of police appropriation of science, have constantly urged 
greater reshaping along NPM lines. Yet there has been little rigorous assessment of the 
possible effects of these currents, either on police uses of forensic science, or on the 
production of forensic scientific knowledge itself. Hence this paper seeks to address the 
question of the effect of liberalizing tendencies on both the professional relationship of 
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forensic scientists and police, and the kind of knowledge which is produced in the 
course of such interactions. In doing so, it seeks to critically address the question of 
how such policies are being appropriated in an important area of public life.    
 
I seek to address this question by focusing on how these policies have influenced the 
co-evolution of the relationship between scientific and policing interests. Through the 
examination of a number of initiatives, including specific frameworks, guidelines and 
procedures, I chart how processes of scientific integration within policing are being 
shaped in different ways by the introduction of liberalizing reforms to police services. I 
argue that such initiatives embody different aspects of the role of modern liberal 
governance, leading to differing (re)-constructions of forensic ‘experts’ (or ‘providers’) 
and police investigators (or ‘customers’). Through a closer study of these initiatives, 
however, it can be seen that tensions emerge which reflect a greater problematization of 
the relationship between science and policing.    
 
This paper is based upon data obtained from the examination of a variety of texts, 
including official documents, academic journal articles, published statements by 
forensic practitioners, and websites. A number of semi-structured interviews with 
practitioners and other forensic science stakeholders, carried out between 2006 and 
2010, also served to augment the study.  In what follows I first outline the history of 
attempts to introduce a commercialized system of police scientific support. I then show 
how efforts to promote more ‘scientific’ behaviours among forensic scientists and their 
customers have been heavily dependent on the rise of probabilistic methods for 
evidential interpretation. With recourse to specific examples, I show how these have 
been appropriated for the purposes of forensic investigation in such a manner as to also 
reflect economic imperatives. In a subsequent section I then describe a series of 
developments which demonstrate the contending influence of police interests, but 
which also represent a response to liberalizing policies. Through these examples I show 
how the reconstruction of scientists and police in this latter mode produces certain 
points of tension regarding the professional and epistemic autonomy of forensic 
scientists and police. I conclude by briefly discussing how the issues raised in the paper 
point to a methodological orientation which invites further inquiry.    
 
Creating the Market: The Evolution of Police Scientific Support Arrangements in 
England and Wales 
 
At the heart of reforms to the provision of scientific support to policing in England and 
Wales is the introduction of the ‘modernizing’ economic rationality associated with 
‘New Public Management’ (NPM). Variants of this approach to the organization and 
delivery of public goods and services have continued to influence all public sector 
domains over the last 25 years. This approach, described by Garland (2001: 190) as ‘a 
ragbag of techniques, models, analogies and recipes for action that are loosely bound up 
by their appeal to economic rationality’ has meant that police work – including that part 
of forensic scientific support provided by the public sector –  has increasingly been 
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understood as simply one of the many 'markets in services, provision and expertise' 
(Dean 1999: 161) that make up modern public sector organizations in general. 
 
The endorsement by the Audit Commission of NPM, with its ‘ethos of business 
management, monetary measurement and value-for-money government’ (Garland 
2001: 116) has meant that all forms of police and police-related practice, including 
forensic science, have increasingly become subject to its developing discursive 
framework. The application of measures of ‘economy’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ 
have been central to how various kinds of forensic support have been interrogated and 
shaped within the Police Forces of England and Wales (Home Office 1983). An early 
example of such influence can be seen in the report of the accountants  
commissioned by the Home Office to review the organization of scientific support in 
these forces (Touche Ross 1987). This report serves as a crucial historical document 
because its economic style of reasoning has provided a framework to which almost all 
subsequent studies have felt necessary to refer and, more often than not, endorse and 
adopt (Williams 2007a: 773).  
 
Among the many issues considered in this report was the scope for changes in the 
method of funding and organization of the provision of forensic science to the police, 
who at the time were solely served by the Forensic Science Service (FSS). The report 
concluded that the police management of scientific support from both in-house 
laboratories, and from the FSS, was ‘generally poor’ (Touche Ross 1987: 3). It 
recommended the appointment of managers of scientific support in each force, 
employed by police forces, and responsible for the provision of all scientific services 
and the management of their own force forensic science budgets. This in itself 
represented a major step toward the growing devolution of budget responsibilities to 
operational law enforcement actors.   
 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, which reported to Parliament in July 1993, 
largely endorsed further reforms of police scientific support. While the Commission 
addressed a wide-ranging series of issues relating to criminal justice, it gave broad 
support to the further development of free market competition for forensic scientific 
services. However, in recognizing the considerable growth in the number and variety of 
private firms offering scientific support to both prosecution and defence, the 
Commission also raised concerns about how the quality of forensic science could be 
maintained (Roberts 1996: 39).  
 
Even before the Royal Commission reported, the FSS had introduced a system of direct 
charging to forces and other clients (McFarland 2003). During the early half of the 
1990s, other firms began to compete for business with the FSS, most notably LGC and 
Scientifics Ltd. Both of these providers had their origins in the public sector before 
becoming private suppliers of forensic science services. In 1996, Forensic Alliance, the 
first truly private sector forensic firm, entered the market. In the same year, the FSS 
replaced standard charging (per item submitted) with product-based charging. In the 
latter methodology each product, such as a body fluid search, tool mark examination or 
cannabis identification, was defined as encompassing a standard set of forensic 
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activities (Cook et al 1998a). Rather than providing a price for each test, the whole 
activity was costed to give a price more closely related to the actual work performed, 
‘thus providing customers with a better understanding of the true costs of services and 
enabling them to make informed judgements about their value’ (NAO 1998: 30). 
Charging was seen as a key mechanism to control demand on the part of the police and 
to compel the traditionally internally focused laboratories to respond to the needs of 
their 'customers'.  
 
As the pricing strategies of forensic service providers became more sophisticated, signs 
grew that forces were exploiting the new market conditions. In 2003, the government 
commissioned McFarland review assessed the management and business structures of 
the FSS in the light of increased competition for forensic science services (McFarland 
2003). Forensic Science Providers (FSPs) were, at this time, offering volume discounts 
and loyalty schemes, which convinced the McFarland review that a ‘truly competitive 
market’ was ‘beginning to develop’ in UK forensics (McFarland 2003, Section 3.1).  
Furthermore, the review went on to argue that the introduction of ‘Best Value’ 
principles ‘had forced the police to seek better value for money in the bought-in 
services’ (McFarland 2003, Section 3.3), and that the police had become ‘informed 
customers’, with forces playing off suppliers against each other. Forces interviewed in 
the McFarland Review reported that they had begun to receive ‘a more personalized 
and responsive service’ from suppliers. This, McFarland argued, was a sign that 
competition had started to yield the ‘traditional benefits’ of greater choice, value for 
money and improved service delivery. 
 
This period also saw increased scientific development in certain areas. Firms such as 
the FSS began to offer highly sophisticated technological services, particularly in areas 
such as DNA profiling. The expansion of products and services did, however, lead to 
Home Office concerns that the increased activity in the forensic science market meant 
that police forces and other customers were ‘not well placed to evaluate the quality of 
the service provided across the range of scientific disciplines’ (Home Office 2006: 2). 
Whereas the FSS, as the main state-run provider, had previously been regarded as the 
standards settings body, the subsequent pluralization of the market was seen to have 
created a ‘regulatory gap’ with no independent arbiter. In order to ensure quality 
standards in forensic science, the Home Office proposed the appointment of a Forensic 
Regulator, and in February 2008 Andrew Rennison became the first regulator to adopt 
the role on a permanent basis. Although the precise form of this regulatory regime 
continues to evolve, it has so far led to initiatives such as the National Forensic 
Framework Agreement (NFFA), which was finalized in August 2008. This has served 
to formalize the manner in which the various police forces in England and Wales enter 
into service agreements with commercial FSPs (NPIA 2010).   
 
This brief overview has served to put into context the broader imperatives which have 
shaped the current environment in which forensic science services are now provided to, 
and procured by, police forces. In the midst of these developments, however, another 
series of concerns have emerged. These have largely originated among operational 
forensic scientists themselves, and reflect a growing awareness of the importance of 
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improving standards of scientific propriety. This has fed into a growing series of 
publicly voiced reflections concerning the precise role of the forensic scientist in 
criminal casework. Rather than acting as the mere provider of certain forms of 
evidence, there is growing opinion in some quarters that the ‘essence’ of forensic 
science can be re-framed in terms of ‘the interpretation of those results in the individual 
context of each case’ (Barclay & McCartney 2007). It has been argued that the 
potentially changing roles of forensic scientists reflect ‘radical changes to police 
investigative technique’, engendering a paradigm ‘which places forensic scientists at 
the centre of an ‘open’ process of criminal investigation’ (Barclay and McCartney 
2007). Such arguments support the notion that investigative practice, as a whole, should 
embrace scientific rationality further, rather than continuing to adhere to 
institutionalized policing norms. These assertions promote a form of investigative 
reasoning which does not simply utilize the products of science and technology to 
provide evidence, but where criminal investigation becomes a form of scientific inquiry 
itself. 
 
Probabilistic, risk-aware methods feature increasingly prominently in such 
deliberations, and these methods are viewed in some cases as constituting the epistemic 
heart of forensic inquiry itself (Evett and Joyce 2005). In what follows I describe the 
rise of these methods, and how these support a form of integration which privileges 
scientific interests, with ultimate implications for the relationship between forensic 
scientists and their primary ‘customers’, the police.   
 
Science‐Led Integration: The Rise of Probabilistic Reasoning in Forensics 
I. Origins: Epistemic Risk and the Rise of a ‘New Paradigm’ 
 
Much of the impetus for the promotion of probabilistic methods stems from a growing 
number of critical commentaries to be found in the sociological, legal, and forensic 
literature, which question the epistemological assumptions underpinning many areas of 
forensic science (Lynch 2003, Broeders 2006, 2007, Cole 2009). These criticisms 
centre on the alleged reliance on opaque, subjective means of interpreting evidence, and 
on certain questionable but enduring assumptions, such as the notion that evidence 
demonstrates categorical uniqueness (Williams 2007b). The tendency of examiners to 
draw categorical conclusions about evidential matches are regarded as dangerously 
simplistic, with the risk of contributing toward miscarriages of justice (Broeders 2006).  
In response, a ‘new paradigm’ has been advocated, which rejects these apparently 
fallacious and archaic assumptions (Saks and Koehler 2005). It promotes more 
sophisticated forms of evidential interpretation, based upon a conditional and explicitly 
quantitative orientation involving statistics and probability theory. Proponents of this 
latter approach argue that this ‘new paradigm’ positions forensic science more closely 
to generally accepted standards of scientific propriety, with positive implications both 
for the reliability of the conclusions drawn from forensic evidence, and for the 
epistemic standing of the discipline in relation to the so-called ‘pure’ sciences (Saks 
and Koehler 2005). Such a position has been endorsed in a recent report by The US 
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National Academy of Sciences (NAS 2009), which focused in part on ways to improve 
the reliability and validity of forensic scientific evidence within its jurisdiction (NAS 
2009). It recommended that more work was needed toward the ‘development of 
quantifiable measures of uncertainty in the conclusions of forensic analyses’ (NAS 
2009: S16-S17).  
 
The roots of this ‘new paradigm’ can be partially traced via a series of academic 
deliberations in relation to law and forensic science. The use of probability theory in 
judicial decision making attracted particular interest through an array of influential 
articles published in US legal and forensic literature in the 1960s and early 1970s 
(Kingston 1965a, 1965b, Kaplan 1968, Finkelstein and Fairley 1970, Tribe 1971). 
Prominent discussion focused on the suitability of Bayes Theorem1 as a means of 
evaluating evidence in order to overcome the risks of misusing statistics in courtroom 
deliberations, as exemplified in a series of controversial cases which occurred at the 
time.  At around the same time as these debates were unfolding in legal circles, a 
similar discourse had begun to emerge in the separate, but related field of forensic 
science. A growing preoccupation with notions of scientific propriety increased interest 
in the application of mathematical techniques to the assessment of evidence. This 
reflected the assertion by Paul Kirk, a leading figure in forensic science (or 
‘criminalistics’ as it was routinely known in the US), that his discipline was a ‘science 
of individualization’ (Kirk 1963: 236). Discussions of the possibilities of applying 
statistical methods to the interpretation of evidence reflect this interest in promoting a 
reflexive sense of scientificity. In 1964, a special session on statistics was held at a 
meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, which reflected the ‘growing 
awareness of the usefulness of statistical methods’ (Kingston 1965a: 79). In subsequent 
papers Kirk and his student Charles Kingston outlined the ways in which an advanced 
appreciation of probability theory could illuminate ‘interpretive areas of criminalistics’, 
with favourable consideration given to a Bayesian model (Kirk and Kingston 1964: 
514; 1965a, 1965b).  
 
These areas of activity, in both academic legal and scientific circles, further influenced 
the work of statisticians professionally engaged in forensic science. The work of Evett 
(1984, 1986, 1987) has played a particularly influential role in promoting and 
developing forensic applications of Bayes Theorem. While the use of Bayesian 
methods is not as yet universal, such approaches continue to be keenly discussed in 
forensic scientific circles. Indeed, many discussions about Bayesianism in forensic 
                                                          
1 Bayes Theorem takes the general form: 
Posterior Probability (Probability of a Hypothesis Given Evidence) 
=  (Prior Probability (Probability of Hypothesis) x Probability of Evidence Given The Hypothesis) /Probability of 
Evidence 
 
Or, in mathematical terms: 
 
P (H|E) = P(H) x P(E|H) 
  P(E) 
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science resonate with a certain sense of fundamentalism tinged with evangelical 
fervour: 
 
That framework—call it Bayesian, call it logical—is just so perfect for forensic 
science. All the statisticians I know who have come into this field, and have 
looked at the problem of interpreting evidence within the context of the criminal 
trial, have come to see it as centring around Bayes’s Theorem.’ (Evett and Joyce 
2005: 37). 
 
The work of Evett and colleagues was further endorsed in the 1990s, when the FSS 
commissioned them to develop a framework which has become known as the Case 
Assessment and Interpretation (CAI) model. This latter development represents a 
particularly ambitious attempt to apply Bayesian probability to forensic science, and 
seeks to formulate a common epistemological and methodological basis for the analysis 
of evidence. It represents an attempt to construct an all-encompassing method of 
evidential interpretation for use in the course of criminal investigations, and seeks to 
shape the process of investigative reasoning in a way that logically accounts for 
epistemic risk. CAI seeks to engender greater accountability among forensic 
practitioners, and to more effectively manage the inherent uncertainties of criminal 
investigation.2 Yet as I go on to describe below, CAI also represents an attempt to 
address the new realities of the market system. Hence it marks a notable attempt to 
reform the role and position of forensic scientists within the current criminal justice 
system. 
 
II. Constructing Forensic ‘Providers’ and ‘Users’: The Case Assessment and 
Interpretation (CAI) Model  
 
CAI is designed to be delivered to police users in three overarching phases: an initial 
‘customer requirement’ phase, actual ‘case assessment’, and ‘service delivery’ of 
written statements of test results together with an assessment of their significance 
(Cook et al 1998a: 152). This process is sensitive to feedback, and continually subject 
to review with the customer; new lines of inquiry generated by subsequent 
developments can be readily incorporated into the framework.  The customer 
requirement phase involves a rigorous consideration of the client’s specific needs. Here, 
the construction of an appropriate ‘framework of circumstances’ is taken to be a 
necessary pre-requisite for the development of propositions relevant to the evidence and 
the case. The authors stress the need for scientists to take a ‘balanced view’ of each 
case, in line with what they regard as the principles of ‘the Bayesian view of evidence, 
that it is not sensible for a scientist to attempt to concentrate on the validity of a 
particular proposition without considering at least one alternative’ (Cook et al 1998a: 
153). 
 
                                                          
2 For an in-depth discussion of CAI, see the following: Cook et al (1998a, 1998b, 1999), Evett et al (2000a, 
2000b), Jackson (2000, 2009), and Jackson et al (2006).   
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In the case assessment phase, the scientist is expected to further clarify the propositions 
police officers wish to investigate by re-describing them in more quantitative terms, via 
the generation of likelihood ratios, through which the scientist seeks to organize the 
logical processing of evidential propositions using Bayes Theorem. These take the 
form:  
 
Probability of the evidence if prosecution proposition is true   
Probability of the evidence if defence proposition is true 
 
Prior probability estimates play an important role in the formation of likelihood ratios, 
with scientists being encouraged to base their prior estimates on the most robust 
foundations possible. In this way, CAI emphasizes transparency in terms of the 
assumptions used by scientists, even in the early stages of an investigation: 
  
There are things about what priors have we got and are they sound, are they 
realistic, are they robust and are we good at forming likelihoods with the 
evidence…So it’s testable, it’s exposed, it can be challenged, but it’s explicit, 
people can see the priors that we are using…so anybody else can test them… 
(Interview with CAI Author, 2006) 
 
As indicated by the concern to ‘add value’ to investigations, however, (Jackson 2000: 
84) CAI seeks to link these kinds of analysis with the wider framework of 
circumstances of a case through the concept of the hierarchy of propositions, which 
plays a central role in organizing the way in which propositions are constructed and 
assessed. This hierarchy classifies propositions in order of their relevance to the 
ultimate issue under consideration by the court (Cook et al.1998b). Level I, or the 
source level, relates to propositions concerning the origins of the evidentiary material, 
and exclusively involves the measurement and comparison of quantitative data (Cook et 
al 1998b: 232-233). Level II in the hierarchy, the activity level, involves a greater 
element of reconstruction of the events in each case, and involves the use of Level I 
data to inform the construction of propositions regarding the kinds of activities which 
may have produced the forensic evidence. The final level in the hierarchy, Level III or 
the offence level, concerns the probability that a suspect has committed a criminal 
offence (Cook et al 1998b: 233).  
 
Furthermore, CAI explicitly seeks to promote a mode of service provision which 
optimizes value for money to the primary customers of the FSS. CAI is intended to 
facilitate a more focused approach to the use of forensic evidence, promoting a new 
mode of engagement between forensic scientists and the police, capable of ‘achieving 
improvement through a genuine partnership in which the customer has a greater 
participation than hitherto in decisions about what work is done in the laboratory’ 
(Cook et al 1998a:152, emphasis added). This improved mode of consultation between 
‘providers’ (forensic scientists), and ‘customers’ (police) is intended to ensure the latter 
gain an optimum return on their investment in scientific services. Moreover, CAI is 
intended to enable forensic scientists to advise police on the potential usefulness of 
specific scientific tests. This tailored approach benefits the provider by enabling them 
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to use their own resources as efficiently as possible, by minimizing the amount of 
redundant analyses they may have to carry out.   
 
CAI can also however be seen to represent a certain desire among some forensic 
scientists to lead to a new appreciation of their potential role. As one of the developers 
of CAI commented: 
 
I think we have had a tendency to concentrate on providing analytical findings. 
By that I mean we reported the results of our analytical tests and we left the 
interpretation, or evaluation, of those results to others in the system. I believe 
that is a clear abrogation of our responsibilities for who else is better placed to 
evaluate test results? If we do not evaluate results, how do others evaluate them: 
what framework, what knowledge and what understanding do they have to help 
them evaluate the evidence in a robust, reliable way? (Jackson 2000: 83).  
 
Yet attempts to apply CAI have not been without opposition. Within the framework of 
the CAI, the scientists are meant to act in a facilitative role, helping police to clarify the 
important questions to ask in the course of a case. For the CAI to function effectively, 
and for evidence to exert optimal impact on the course of a case if considered within 
this approach, forensic scientists need potentially high levels of information from the 
police. CAI also promotes the interests of scientists to exert a greater degree of 
influence with regard to which pieces of evidence are seen as most pertinent to a case. 
However, it became clear through field research that this potential re-positioning of 
forensic scientists within the decision-making hierarchy of investigative frameworks 
was not necessarily in keeping with traditional police views: 
 
We had another group of officers who kind of misinterpreted really…we had to 
reassure them we weren’t out to help the defendant… (Interview with CAI 
author, 2007) 
 
Instead, it appeared that some police investigators viewed the role of forensic scientists 
as somewhat more limited: to simply provide scientific data about evidence in relative 
isolation to the deliberations made by police concerning the progress of a criminal case. 
 
Tensions also became apparent with another set of actors – the FSS management 
themselves. Although CAI emphasizes engagement with customers in order to facilitate 
an efficient use of the latter’s resources, it appears that the framework clashed with 
certain management interests: 
 
…I think [the FSS management] felt some commercial problems…there was 
almost a counter-pressure not to apply CAI, because CAI in some ways, said 
‘lets just look at the items that are going to be really effective, really efficient, in 
addressing this question, and if you decide with the customer these are the key 
issues in the case, the strategy to address these key issues is this, this and this...’ 
I think therein lay some of the difficulties from the managers and leaders, 
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because you could see the natural consequences, if we apply CAI…we’re going 
to lose a lot of income, potentially. (Interview with CAI author, 2007) 
 
Nonetheless, CAI has exerted a tangible impact on the reporting practices used by 
forensic scientists. The Association of Forensic Science Providers (AFSP), which 
represents both external and in-house suppliers of scientific services to the police in the 
UK and the Republic of Ireland, has recently adopted a series of standards for reporting 
evidence which are closely modelled on CAI principles (AFSP 2009). This in itself 
reflects a significant degree of progress in promoting a renewed focus on evidence 
interpretation. Previous arrangements meant that forensic scientists operated in a 
largely prosecutorial role. Suspects were initially identified through non-forensic 
means, with the collection and analysis of forensic evidence largely being guided by the 
effort to incriminate them: 
 
It used to be like ‘Life on Mars’ really, you picked somebody who you thought 
might have done it and then tried to prove it, and if that didn’t work you tried to 
prove somebody else did it. (Interview with Forensic Science Consultant, 2008) 
 
The reporting standards recently promulgated by the AFSP mark a notable shift away 
from the ‘Life on Mars’ model. In line with Bayesian methods, forensic scientists are 
obliged, wherever possible, to analyse evidence with reference to two separate 
hypotheses relating to prosecution and defence positions, using the likelihood ratio 
system (AFSP 2009). Furthermore, prior to the analysis scientists are obliged to 
establish ‘the key issues in the case’ that evidential analysis would help inform, with 
recourse to discussions with ‘the relevant client’ (the definition of which encompasses 
not only the police and Crown Prosecution Service, but defence counsel as well). This 
is already reflected in changes to official police documentation. Police officers 
submitting evidence for analysis have to complete submission forms, in which they 
now have to explicitly state the questions that the analysis seeks to address:   
 
[The police] used to give everything to the lab, didn’t tell them what they 
wanted…and then nine months later…you’d get your answers back, they’d say 
‘that’s not what we wanted’! Never tell them [the forensic scientists] what they 
wanted in the first place, didn’t really care too much as they weren’t paying 
anyway! It was nonsense, the labs were swamped and couldn’t cope…[the 
police] were never particularly good with what they submitted…laboratory 
submission forms now, you put down the reasons, rationale for everything you 
submit, its more like an order form…forces tend to be more deliberate about 
what they are asking... (Interview with NPIA representative 2010). 
 
In this way, CAI has helped to promote the shaping of a more ‘informed’ customer. By 
obliging customers to be transparent about their investigative aims, it can be seen to 
have gained a foothold in influencing police behaviours through its adoption by the 
AFSP, and can be seen to have at least partially permeated into the reasoning processes 
of police customers. Such reforms have moved the role of forensic scientists from a 
largely prosecutorial orientation to a more balanced mode of inquiry where both 
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prosecution and defence positions are taken into account. In obligating police officers 
to specify with precision the inquisitorial aims of requested analyses, these reforms 
promote a certain sense of reflexivity in the clients of forensic science. This, along with 
the ability of forensic scientists to question police requests as specified in the AFSP 
guidelines (AFSP 2009), promotes the empowerment of forensic scientists (and 
‘science’ as a whole), and enables ‘informed’ customers to become further educated.  
  
CAI serves as a notable means through which the roles of forensic scientists and their 
customers are re-constructed, yet it also creates a distinct hierarchy. It promotes the 
image of the forensic scientist as instrumental to the investigative process. Scientific 
authority in this case is boosted by using a probabilistic ‘scientific’ discourse to not 
only promote more risk-manageable modes of inquiry, but to function as a device for 
managing the resources of both customer and provider in as cost-effective manner as 
possible. This particular construction of ‘scientific’ authority is not without its tensions 
however, and through them CAI serves to expose not only the epistemological 
differences to be found within the criminal justice system, but also ontological 
differences concerning the role and identity of forensic science, which runs counter to 
previously held notions about policing functions. In what follows I describe a series of 
initiatives which reflect centralizing tendencies which prioritize policing functions 
ahead of scientific concerns, but which do so in a manner which also reflects an 
orientation to neoliberal reform.  
 
Police‐Led Integration: Shaping the Structures of Scientific Support 
I. Centralizing Science: The Home Office Science and Innovation Strategy 
 
The presence of such tendencies can be identified clearly through initiatives such as the 
recent Home Office Science and Innovation Strategy 2009-12. This is stated as aiming 
to ‘establish priorities for current and future science and technology applications and 
research’, and ‘to co-ordinate the development and implementation of technology 
between users and suppliers to ensure a coherent and effective process’ (Home Office 
2009: 3, original emphasis). It outlines ‘the necessary capabilities which police forces 
need to establish to meet both national and their local priorities, and overall 
requirements in technology to provide those capabilities.’ 
  
The development and implementation of this Strategy is in turn overseen by the Police 
Science and Technology Strategy Group, which consists of a series of influential actors, 
including those tasked with organizing and overseeing the delivery of policing 
functions in general (Home Office, Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), 
Association of Police Authorities (APA) etc), together with the most prominent 
external supplier of scientific support (FSS). The ‘strategy’ that is being promulgated in 
this instance forms part of the overall National Policing Plan (NPP) for forces in 
England and Wales, the latter requiring that forces and police authorities should use the 
Strategy ‘as a framework to inform their individual plans for the use of science and 
technology.’ (Home Office 2009: 6).  
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It should be clear that the Strategy seeks to co-ordinate the introduction of scientific 
innovations in a largely centralized fashion. Despite the document stating that is not 
intended to ‘usurp or replace individual plans and strategies’ (6), it emphasizes the 
benefits of a common approach, supported on a national level:  
 
Working together rather than acting individually will allow forces to learn from 
each other by sharing solutions though in some cases solutions are best provided 
and funded nationally for the overall benefit of the service and the public. 
(Home Office 2009: 7)  
 
Furthermore, while it is made clear that the Science and Innovation Strategy is intended 
to ‘accelerate the improvement of police capabilities’ to allow the latter to contribute 
‘most effectively to the delivery of national priorities’, it is also notable in that it 
explicitly states ‘it is not intended to promote science and technology for its own sake.’ 
(Home Office 2009: 7, emphasis added). Instead, the Strategy Group employs a method 
called ‘top-down modelling’ to understand the ‘links between policing requirements 
and the individual technologies’. Based on existing systems developed by the military, 
models of the ‘urban and general environment’ are used to ‘indicate how existing 
technology can assist in crime and terrorist environments, and how new technologies 
can develop new solutions’. Through this, the Strategy Group is able to ‘influence and 
promote both the propagation and implementation of the strategy’ (Home Office 2009: 
7). It operates in order to maintain the authority of law enforcement agencies, shaped in 
a ‘top-down’ fashion by government priorities. Police oversight bodies such as ACPO, 
APA and the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) therefore play an 
instrumental role in shaping the kinds of products, and their mode of provision, upon 
which their subordinates rely. The Strategy is therefore able to play an influential role 
in circumscribing the choices operational police officers are able to make with regard to 
the kind of technologies they wish to utilize.  
 
II. Toward an Alternative Construction of ‘Providers’ and ‘Customers’: Forensics21 and 
the NFFA 
 
Linked with these centralizing tendencies are a separate set of issues which state and 
police actors have used as justification to dictate the terms of the ongoing 
‘improvement’ of scientific support. Here, the discourse is concerned with the way in 
which forensic science is able to conform to the measures of ‘economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness’ so closely associated with NPM. For example, the ‘Forensics21’ strategy 
recently launched by the NPIA, intended to shape ‘a police-led forensic service fit for 
the 21st century’ (Bramble 2009: 2), has sought to address certain priorities regarding 
the use and deployment of forensic science. These priorities reflect a number of 
perceived shortcomings, ranging from: high levels of variance between individual 
practitioners in terms of performance, ‘unacceptable’ rates of attrition, ‘significant’ 
variations in the ability of forces to convert identifications into detections, delays in 
updating marks and prints resulting in an ‘unacceptable’ number of potential suspects 
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being released from custody, and a ‘fragmented’ approach in terms of forces 
disseminating advice concerning the effective use and deployment of forensic 
techniques.  Forensics21 currently involves a number of projects aimed at helping to 
address these and other perceived shortcomings in forensic science provision to the 
police. Aligned to this is the stated possibility of exploring in more detail ‘how forensic 
science may be used to best effect’, such that it provides direct benefits, e.g. ‘reduced 
investigation time, increased detections, increased ‘cold hits’; shorter time to arrest; 
improved public confidence; new links to outstanding crime; early intervention etc’ 
(Bramble 2009: 4).  
 
Forensics21 therefore represents a certain preoccupation with the constant improvement 
of forensic science in relation to a series of prioritized metrics relating to speed of 
delivery, standardization of practitioner behaviours, and investigative outcomes. The 
use of such ‘targets’ represents a sophisticated interpretation of the supposed tenets of 
NPM. The terms of ‘improvement’, and their instrumentalities, are very much set here 
by the overseers of policing, rather than scientists themselves. Hence this example 
shows further how this depiction of ‘forensic science’ is a form which is able to be 
readily shaped by central authority, with relatively little input from forensic scientists 
themselves in terms of how their discipline may develop. Rather than being regarded as 
a discipline in its own right, ‘forensic science’ once again becomes a term used more to 
describe a series of services, and less concerning a unique set of epistemic activities 
operating in accordance with common underlying principles.   
 
The discourse in this case is therefore more concerned with how existing scientific 
initiatives and technologies can be applied to policing. Although such developments are 
recognized as potentially leading to certain changes in existing police approaches to 
criminal investigation, the process of the incorporation of new technologies is regarded 
as being relatively unproblematic, and indeed is regarded as largely benefiting and 
enhancing police procedures. Scientific contributions are intended to be incorporated 
into existing police practices, which implies a certain a priori acceptance of 
institutionalized epistemological behaviours, with ‘scientific’ evidence being able to be 
readily incorporated into existing procedural frames of reference. More notably still, it 
is apparent here that the epistemological foundations of this applied scientific 
knowledge are unproblematized and unchallenged by police and state actors. While 
science is viewed as providing an instrumental (and largely authoritative and 
immutable) solution to the societal risk of crime, far less concern is exhibited in relation 
to epistemic risk, the potential adverse outcomes associated with ignoring such risk, 
and the impact that such outcomes may have on the image of both policing and science. 
Moreover, less concern is given to the epistemic and/or cognitive processes used by 
forensic scientists, their potential fallibilities, or whether these kinds of reasoning 
behaviours may be particularly distinctive.3  
                                                          
3 One other characteristic of this posture is the seeming conflation between forensic science (which is often 
exclusively associated with criminal detection in the writings of certain commentators), and crime 
prevention.  Hence the strategic posture adopted here extends the use of science and technology to a further 
set of pre-emptive functions.   
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The influence of police-led integration is also evident in the operationalization of the 
National Forensic Framework Agreement (NFFA). This framework specifies in detail 
the arrangements for the procurement and provision of forensic sciences supplied by 
commercial FSPs. In entering into contract arrangements with police forces under the 
terms of the NFFA, FSPs are obliged to supply a highly specified form of scientific 
support across a range of specific, delineated criminal investigative functions. These 
functions, or ‘work packages’, range from routine scientific analyses in areas such as 
DNA analysis, fire investigation and footwear analysis, to more complex ‘casework’ 
packages relating to serious crime, where forensic scientists may be tasked with helping 
to interpret evidence in relation to a particular investigation. The repertoire of work 
packages offered under the terms of the NFFA represents the diversity of analytical 
activities performed by forensic scientists. Under the terms of each work package, 
specific forensic activities are clearly defined in a cost-code system: 
  
That’s how it is now structured…codes refer to specific activities…for example, 
‘BFs’ are body fluids, biology stuff. 01BF for example is the processing of 
stains from crime scenes for DNA purposes, a swab of blood from a windowsill, 
cigarette end left by a burglar, that sort of thing. Simple routine stuff. And that 
product, itself, has got requirements written in it that the company has to be able 
to provide… (Interview with NPIA representative, 2010).   
 
However, the move toward such arrangements has met with opposition from scientists: 
 
There is quite a bit of ‘anti’ this, in the laboratory world, particularly the staff, 
the scientists, because they see it as too commercially focused now, and they 
haven’t got the ability to use their own initiative, to innovate, because if it isn’t 
within one of these products [codes], in theory the company couldn’t charge for 
it, it might not be something the force has requested anyway…the scientists see 
it as a shackle… (Interview with NPIA representative 2010). 
 
The perceived erosion of the professional autonomy of forensic scientists has 
stimulated concerns about whether the standardization of forensic science provision is 
affecting the interests of justice. As a recent investigation by the BBC Radio Four series 
File on Four uncovered, forensic scientists have expressed concerns about the way in 
which they have been directed by police when undertaking crime scene investigations. 
The cost code systems which are now used specify with great precision the analyses 
which forensic scientists are obliged to carry out. Yet the File on Four investigation 
demonstrated that forensic scientists often disagreed with police over the best course of 
action during casework, although they were often contractually constrained in terms of 
which activities they could undertake. The programme gave an example of one forensic 
scientist who had contributed to the successful investigation of a case only by ignoring 
police instructions and pursuing analyses which had not been originally commissioned 
(BBC 2009).    
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Under these arrangements, providers are largely obliged to be responsive to customers 
needs, rather than taking a proactive approach. This supports the assertion of Fraser 
(2007) who has argued that the introduction of a marketized system has led to a ‘shift 
from the expert power of the laboratories to that of the police’ (Fraser 2007: 384). With 
police largely dictating the type of scientific tests to be conducted, the epistemic 
standing of the forensic scientist is potentially under threat from certain aspects of the 
NFFA. Here, it can be seen that in many aspects of provision, there are tight controls 
surrounding the way in which forensic services are provided. The notion of 
‘partnership’ found in the CAI literature is significantly under-represented here.   
 
Discussion 
 
The kinds of sites where the social and the scientific intertwine have constituted the 
focus of a number of influential studies which have sought to characterize the precise 
form and role that such sites play in stabilizing understandings of science (Starr and 
Griesemer 1989, Latour 1990, Callon 2006). This study has broadly relied upon 
identifying such points of intersection in order to investigate the relationship between 
modern policing and science by examining some of the kinds of formal guidelines, 
frameworks and strategies that have arisen in the light of recent infrastructural reform. I 
have sought to demonstrate how, through a focus on such initiatives, it is possible to 
show how scientific developments evolve interdependently with social orderings. These 
kinds of initiatives therefore represent highly useful sites through which to examine a 
particular process of co-evolution in an area which resists straightforward analysis.  
 
Key to understanding this process are the differing normative interpretations of the 
course of scientific integration within policing. Williams (2007a) provides some 
guidance here in his distinction between so-called ‘structural’ and ‘procedural’ 
interpretations of scientific integration (Williams 2007a: 771). Here, ‘structural’ 
interpretations portray forensic science as a mere source of technical assistance to 
investigators, which emphasize the organization of forensic practitioners in the service 
of the police. ‘Procedural’ integration on the other hand, promotes an understanding of 
scientific support which ‘acknowledges the distinctive knowledge-based expertise’ of 
forensic practitioners (Williams 2007a: 772). The previous sections have sought to 
show how the ‘procedural’ interpretation inheres in attempts to promote scientific 
interests in forensic science, whereas ‘structural’ interpretations favour police interests. 
 
It should be clear that the two sets of interests overlap and intertwine within the kind of 
initiatives outlined in this paper. Evidence interpretation based on AFSP principles 
forms one part of the activities specified in the ‘casework’ packages of the NFFA, and 
CAI is still reliant on the input of police customers for its operation. Nonetheless, each 
initiative strongly favours one or the other mode of integration. AFSP reporting 
guidelines are designed with customer consultation in mind, but very much in terms 
which favour a particular ‘scientific’ mode of reporting. Even though they allow 
customers to choose which evidence to submit, the use of CAI principles such as the 
hierarchy of propositions provides forensic scientists with powerful ways of justifying 
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advice regarding the potential usefulness of specific evidential analyses to an 
investigation. Conversely, while evidence interpretation is recognized in the NFFA, it is 
only specified in particular work packages in such a way that it dictates precisely which 
forensic scientists are contractually allowed to engage in interpretation. Hence each of 
these initiatives display design features which promote differential orderings of 
interests. 
 
A focus on some of these features provides an indication of the way in which these 
differential orderings arise. The example of CAI demonstrates how an interest in 
bestowing greater epistemic independence to science is met using a probabilistic 
discourse to frame information exchanges in a quantitative manner, involving Bayes 
Theorem to assess ‘prosecution’ and ‘defence’ hypotheses. By rendering investigation 
in such a form, interests in maintaining perceived standards of scientific propriety are 
able to be advanced. Moreover, CAI can be seen to represent an attempt at the general 
reform of underlying processes, rather than seeking to meet the clearly stipulated 
objectives found in examples such as Forensics21. The ultimate outcomes of this 
reform process are not entirely specific, except that ‘science’ is regarded as marking out 
a gradual evolutionary course in an open-ended process of improvement of forensic 
practice.  
 
The heavily quantitative orientation adopted by CAI also obligates scientists to adopt a 
position of greater epistemological transparency, an aspect which resonates with 
arguments to be found in the sociological literature. For example Rose (1996) argues 
that so-called ‘advanced liberal’ forms of governance detach expertise from political 
apparatus, re-positioning experts ‘within a market governed by the rationalities of 
competition, accountability and consumer demand’ (Rose 1996: 41). According to 
Rose, auditing becomes ‘one of the key mechanisms for responding to the plurality of 
expertise and the inherent controversy and undecidability of its truth claims’ (55). In 
effectively functioning as an epistemic audit, CAI embodies this aspect of 
liberalization, challenging the closed and opaque epistemologies previously accrued to 
many forms of forensic ‘expertise’. 
  
As well as promulgating a particular form of scientificity, CAI represents a distinct 
response to the implementation of a market system, by constructing the provider-
customer relationship in a particular way. This in itself represents a particular 
appropriation of the modern liberal ethos which embraces the standardizing rationality 
of science as an important organizing principle. Through this rationality, CAI is also 
able promote a discourse of efficiency. Through a concern with resource constraints, it 
creates a representation of the scientist as the provider of a tailored ‘value for money’ 
service, able to advise an ‘informed’ customer on the probative ‘worth’ of a particular 
form of evidence in the light of a particular case.   
 
While CAI largely favours scientific interests, an alternative, police-led integration 
agenda is more apparent in other initiatives. These help shape a decidedly instrumental 
form of scientific inquiry, focusing more on the importance of the applications of 
science and technology rather than exhibiting any overriding concern with the 
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‘scientific method’ per se. Here, forensic science becomes largely outcome-led. For 
example, under the control of the NFFA, scientific tests are sold in bulk, and activities 
are split into well-specified ‘products’. The provision of forensic knowledge-forming 
activities is subject to ever greater forms of standardization, at the possible expense of 
the professional autonomy of scientists. Any underlying philosophical concern with the 
‘scientific method’ is effectively ‘black-boxed’ (Latour 1987).  
 
The NPM concern with performance measurement is prevalent in the edicts of 
Forensics21, which serves to drive technological innovation in a way which seeks to 
address a series of prioritized metrics of performance. Forensics21 may also be seen to 
be promoted in the name of ‘accountability’, albeit in a different fashion to science-led 
initiatives like CAI. As Power (2004) points out, the notion of public accountability has 
been reframed in the modern era in relation to business-led concepts such as goal 
definition, efficient resource allocation, and financial performance (Power 2004: 12). 
Initiatives such as Forensics21 represent a particular concern with public 
accountability, but which also feeds into the need for strong central control. The crisis 
caused by the emergence of the plurality of expertise generated by technological 
progress leads authorities to intervene in order to delineate precise forms of expertise 
and their mode of provision. This ensures that relevant forms of expertise meet with 
wider governmental objectives which are themselves subject to greater accountability. 
Hence, although the new accountability is meant to guard against the failures of a 
hierarchical, ‘command and control’ form of authority, central interventions, such as 
Forensics21, are required to ensure this new form of authority is maintained (Power 
2004: 12-13). The central tension at the heart of modern liberal governance, between 
the need to devolve services, and the need to maintain control over the risks arising 
from such a devolution, is apparent in this case.   
 
The initiatives described in this paper not only represent different, hybridized 
constructions of ‘scientific’ integration, but also display different aspects of liberalizing 
policies. Within these initiatives however can be seen sources of considerable tension, 
which may potentially affect the future viability of such forms. Many of these tensions 
originate from the actors themselves who are embedded in these assemblages. The 
means by which the design of these, and subsequent initiatives, continue to evolve, may 
be due in significant part to the precise way in which actors seek to either maintain or 
resist their position within these assemblages. The kinds of behaviours which actors 
adopt in order to do so represents just one further line of inquiry. 
 
Given the plurality of products, services, and activities which this domain now 
encompasses, any attempt to understand the effect of commercial imperatives on the 
shaping of forensic science will necessarily have its limitations. This study has limited 
itself to examining just some of the responses to this trend. However, it has sought to 
build on previous studies of scientific commercialization (Mirowski and Van Horn 
2005) by showing further how conceptions of ‘commercialization’ or ‘liberalization’ 
themselves co-emerge through the production of scientific knowledge. In terms of the 
wider social significance of this research orientation, it is worth noting that this ongoing 
process of co-emergence may have the potential to extend to other fundamental societal 
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norms. It is now apparent that discourses surrounding the concept of ‘value’ in forensic 
science are now extending to how that term relates to the delivery of justice (Discussion 
with FSS representative, 2010). Hence it may be the case that the concept of ‘justice’ 
itself is susceptible to being reconfigured and potentially swallowed by the co-
production of science/neoliberalism. Many concerns have already been expressed 
within the law and forensic sectors about the potential tensions between commercial 
imperatives and judicial concerns (i.e. commercial confidentiality v disclosure etc), and 
whether judicial systems in England and Wales (and elsewhere) are suitably equipped 
to fully assess increasingly sophisticated scientific claims, potentially complicated 
further by the chaff of commerciality. The fluidity and pliability that the 
science/neoliberal nexus demonstrates bring concerns over whether it has the potential 
to infect adjacent juridical concerns. Precisely what do the processes of the future 
constructions of science and liberalization hold for the delivery of justice? 
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